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 The property tax is the oldest tax in the United States, as well as being the only substantial tax 
on landed wealth, a major part of the housing expense of most American families, and the most 
important revenue source for local governments. It is also increasingly constrained by law. Since 
1978, when California voters approved a ballot measure called Proposition 13 to limit the annual 
increase of local property tax revenues, 26 other states have enacted similar legislation. These 
property tax limitations are popular—one U.S. poll from summer 2014 finds that 70% of American 
adults agree that State government should limit the percentage that property taxes can be raised each 
year (Princeton Survey Research Associates International 2014)—but their effects are poorly 
understood.  
 This paper synthesizes the existing literature on property tax limitations to argue that they 
provide some homeowners with social protection at the price of diminished state capacity. Karl 
Polanyi (2001 [1944]) coined the term social protection to describe collective efforts to protect social 
relations from the disruptive effects of market exchange. Polanyi argued that land is often the focus of 
demands for social protection because land is a fictitious commodity (2001 [1944], p. 71)—both 
necessary for human social reproduction, and especially subject to market failures. This paper 
proposes an extension of his argument to the domain of fiscal sociology. Taxation can itself become 
the object of demands for social protection. Where authorities tax homeowners according to the 
market value of real estate, e.g., the tax itself can turn price fluctuations into income shocks, and 
demands to protect the values of home and community from the corrosive effects of the price 
mechanism therefore may extend to demands for protection from tax liability. Property tax limitations 
protect homeowners by decoupling their rights to habitation from the vagaries of market prices. But 
they also reduce public revenues, and thereby reduce the state’s capacity to provide social protection 
in other ways and to other groups. 
 The paper proceeds in two parts. The first part outlines a Polanyian theory of property 
taxation, and provides a capsule overview of evidence for a Polanyian interpretation of the politics of 
property tax limitation. The second part summarizes the effects of property tax limitation on state 
capacity by means of a formal meta-regression analysis of published studies of the effects of property 
tax limitations on property taxes, public revenues and expenditures. Many of the most vigorous 
debates about property tax limitation in the public sphere concern its impact on other aspects of social 
life; critics charge, for example, that a policy of property tax limitation can exacerbate housing 
inequality, distort land-use decisions, impair residential mobility, worsen local public services, block 
educational opportunity, and undermine trust in local government (see e.g. Schrag 1998). Whatever 
the indirect effects of property tax limitations on such distal outcomes, they are generally assumed to 
exert such effects by changing how governments tax and spend. Measures of tax revenues are a 
conventional indicator of state capacity, because taxation provides fungible resources for all of the 
activities of states (Lieberman, 2002; Martin, Mehrotra, and Prasad, 2009). This study investigates the 
effects of property taxation on state capacity by separately summarizing the available quantitative 
evidence on threee points: whether property tax limitations have the intended effect of reducing 
property taxes; whether they induce local governments to increase other, non-property taxes; and 
what net impact they may have on the magnitude of local government budgets. The evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that property tax limitations, on average, reduce aggregate local 
spending by as much as 5%. This is a substantial reduction in public spending, and the paper 
concludes with reflections on what implications property tax limitation might have for other aspects 
of social life. 
 
Property tax between state and market 
 
 All taxes can be contentious. A tax is an obligation to transfer resources into a public fund 
without direct remuneration. The absence of direct and immediate recompense may establish an 
expectation of indirect reciprocity, as when taxpayers expect good government in return for their 
contributions. It thereby also creates the potential for conflict (see Martin et al., 2009; cf. Mauss, 1990 
[1925]). The exchange is never exact, and the fairness of the transfer is, therefore, always potentially 
in question. It is likely that every tax has been evaded or resisted, at least sometimes. 
 The property tax may be particularly prone to provoking conflict, however, because it is 
primarily a tax on the market value of real estate. Although some state and local governments tax 
certain forms of moveable property, the bulk of the tax is on land, and on structures whose value 
derives substantially from their location on the land (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and Minnesota 
Center for Fiscal Excellence, 2017). Land has peculiar characteristics that make it different from—
and potentially more contentious than—other taxable resources. The most important of these 
characteristics derive from the fact that land is fixed in space. 
 The spatial fixity of land has made land tax a primary power resource for state-builders. A 
state is an organization that monopolizes the legitimate means of violence within a given territory 
(Weber 1946 [1918], p. 78). Its power derives from its legitimacy, but also from its ability to cage 
people and resources within its territory (Mann, 1986). People are mobile; the means of violence are 
portable. Land is neither. It is therefore a particularly opportune tax base for governments that do not 
control their borders. Producers can flee across the frontier to escape the tax collector, but they cannot 
carry their land with them. In part for this reason, land tax was one of the earliest forms of taxation, 
and one of the most universal in early states (Weber, 1924). Land tax lost importance in the early 
modern era as states established internal markets with well-defined borders: internal trade provided 
other resources to tax, and border enforcement permitted the collection of tariffs and customs duties 
on external trade (Seligman, 1919). But real estate remains an especially important tax base for sub-
national governments within federal states (Bird and Slack, 2002; Slack, 2011). These are small 
polities with open borders. They do not much tax financial wealth, which can be easily carried across 
city limits. They tax real estate because it cannot. 
 The spatial fixity of land also makes land tax into a primary tool by which states have 
encouraged the development of private property and market exchange. A farm household in an 
agrarian society might be able to subsist without selling its produce or its labor power—but only until 
it is compelled by force to come up with money to pay taxes. The attachment of monetary obligations 
to land has often forced people had to sell their land, sell their produce, or move in search of work. 
Weber (1891) argued that Western European ideas of private property had their origins in the 
administration of Roman land taxes, which individuated parcels and disambiguated ownership for the 
purpose of assigning fiscal obligations. Polanyi (2001 [1944], p. 172) pointed to colonial hut taxes as 
a key device by which European imperial powers deliberately forced colonized people to join labor 
markets. Even within developed market economies, the taxation of land is often seen as a tool by 
which states can encourage more intensive capitalist development (e.g. Dye and England, 2010).  
 The same characteristic of land also makes it a site of resistance to market relations. Land is 
central to human social reproduction and will remain so as long as community requires proximity in 
space. We come to value particular places because of the social activites that they enable and the 
associated meanings that those places hold for us. The use value of a place on earth includes its 
capacity to produce social or aesthetic experiences that are unique to that place. The difference 
between the use value of land and its exchange value in the marketplace is a contradiction in the 
Marxian sense that people who value the same place in these different ways may come into conflict 
(Molotch and Logan, 1990). Those who wish to realize the exchange value of land must appropriate it 
as private property, with the associated rights to exclude others, including others who may have deep 
social ties or sentimental attachments to the place. Those who regard a particular place as unique and 
incomparable because of what it means to them may resist those who value the same place primarily 
as a speculative investment, for whom its value comes from its interchangeability with other land and 
other commodities. Lefebvre (1991) famously, and obscurely, characterized the incompatibility 
between these viewpoints as a conflict between “representational space” and “representations of 
space.” Polanyi (2001 [1944], p. 35), focusing on conflict between people who dwell on the land and 
people who sell the land for profit, described it as a conflict of “habitation versus improvement.” 
 The spatial fixity of land also creates opportunities for collective action. Neighbors have 
particular capacities for collective action by virtue of the fact that they occupy adjoining places. The 
value of land, whether in use or in exchange, comes from its location in relation to other valuable 
land, and neighbors therefore often develop common sentimental attachments to the same places and 
common economic interests in those places. They also have opportunities for face-to-face interaction 
that make it easier to mobilize collectively. The creation of markets always involves exclusion. But 
the creation of markets in land—more than the creation of markets in linen coats, software, or abstract 
financial instruments—tends to affront the customary rights of people who have the opportunity for 
collective action. For this reason, the creation of markets in land may be especially likely to generate 
what Polanyi called a countermovement (p. 136), or a countervailing collective action to sequester 
resources from market pressures. Polanyi argued that countermovements were especially to be 
expected when markets threatened people’s customary standards of living. He included under the 
heading of countermovements a wide variety of measures and policies that might protect people from 
the economic shocks induced by market competition (p. 79).  
 A countermovement may be directed against property taxation because of the link between 
land taxes and market relations. A tax on the market value of real estate, for example, will fluctuate 
with price movements—and it can thereby transmit price shocks to people who value the land for its 
use. Consider a homeowner who derives no cash income from the ownership of a home, and who 
values it for its unique sentimental qualities rather than as a speculative investment. This homeowner 
nevertheless may owe property tax on the nominal market value of that home. That market value can 
be quite volatile for any of a number of reasons beyond the control of the household: the market value 
of a home may increase because, say, a neighborhood becomes fashionable, or the local labor force 
grows rapidly, or investors decide that housing is an especially attractive investment relative to other 
forms of wealth. Rapid increase in the value of a home can cause rapid changes in the household’s tax 
obligations and thereby cause substantial shocks to a household’s budget (see Anderson, 2012; 
Sheffrin, 2013). 
 Protest movements against the property tax have followed just such shocks. Figure 1 
illustrates the pattern by depicting a time series of the annual rate of change in the aggregate value of 
owner-occupied housing minus the annual rate of change in GDP. The peaks in the graph correspond 
to years in which the property tax caused or exacerbated especially severe household income shocks, 
whether because taxable housing wealth was increasing much more rapidly than income, or because 
income was falling much more rapidly than taxable housing wealth. Several of the peaks correspond 
to the most historically significant years of property tax protest in the long twentieth century, 
beginning with the Populist rebellion of the 1890s, which was directed partly against property tax 
grievances (see, e.g., McMath, 1993). Much of the subsequent historiography of property tax protest 
focuses on the state of California, where property values were particularly volatile in the twentieth 
century, and some examples from the historical literature on California will illustrate the twentieth-
century pattern.  
• California farmers and real estate agents launched a grassroots referendum campaign in 1910 
for a measure called Amendment 1 that would shift the tax burden from land to corporate 
income (Martin, 2015). 
• Several California municipalities experienced property tax strikes in 1932, and state officials 
proposed a program of property tax relief to pre-empt the threat of a California-wide tax strike 
(Martin, 2008; on other property tax strikes of 1932, see Beito, 1989).  
• A Los Angeles property reassessment in the winter of 1957-8 provoked what Lo (1990, p. 
112) has called the largest tax protest in California. 
• The summer and fall of 1977 saw the largest petition drive in the history of California to that 
point, in support of a constitutional amendment to limit the property tax (Allswang, 2000).  
An exception that tests the rule is 1946, the year of the greatest peak in the graph, when there was no 
property tax rebellion to speak of; what there was instead was the largest industrial strike wave in 
American history, in which the strikers demanded greater incomes, not least to meet the rising price of 
housing. In Oakland, California, for example, that year saw a historic general strike, followed the next 
year by an unprecedented grassroots mobilization to elect a labor slate to the city council on a 
platform that addressed the high cost of housing. The insurgent candidates demanded rent controls 
and a redistribution of the property tax burden from working class homeowners onto downtown 
businesses (see Rhomberg 2004, pp. 111-2). The comparison of these episodes suggests that the rapid 
increase of housing prices relative to income predictably created a critical mass of aggrieved potential 
protesters, although the mere fact of this shared grievance did not tightly constrain the form of their 
protest, or the policy remedies that they would demand. 
-------------------- 
FIG 1 HERE 
------------------- 
 In the 1970s, these protest movements increasingly promoted a particular policy remedy: a 
law limiting the annual increase in the property tax levy. Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative number of 
states with property tax limitations. It counts states that had a legal limit on the annual increase in the 
total property tax revenues collected by local governments, and it includes limitations from the date 
that they effectively covered all categories of local government within a given state, including cities, 
counties, and school districts or the equivalent. What the graph illustrates is that property tax 
limitation policies began to spread particularly rapidly in the 1970s.  
-------------------- 
FIG 2 HERE 
------------------- 
 The micro-level evidence from studies of public opinion and voting is consistent with the 
hypothesis that it was rising property values that most encouraged popular mobilization for these 
property tax limitation policies. One study of Milwaukee, for example, found that the homeowners 
who signed a petition in support of property tax limitation in the summer of 1978 had experienced 
increases in the assessed market value of their property more than four times greater than the average 
for the city (Stein, Hamm and Freeman 1983, p. 190). In California, opinion polls showed that support 
for property tax limitation surged in Los Angeles County in the spring of 1978 immediately following 
the mailing of property reassessment notices, which notified taxpayers of large increases in the 
taxable market value of their homes; counties that did not mail reassessment notices saw no such 
surge in support (Sears and Citrin, 1986). Post-election polls from the June 1978 primary in California 
show that the magnitude of the expected property tax increase correlated strongly with the likelihood 
of voting in favor of Proposition 13 (Martin 2006, p. 545). Post-election polling from November 1978 
in Michigan found that voters who paid a large share of property tax compared to others in the same 
community—that is, holding the local property tax rate constant—said they wanted greater reductions 
in public spending and were generally more likely to support property tax limitation (Courant, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1980, p. 6). In Massachusetts, a post-election survey from November 1980 
found that residents of communities with the highest property tax rates were least likely to support 
property tax limitation (Ladd and Wilson 1983, p. 259). By contrast, homeowners the assessed market 
value of whose property was highest relative to others in the same community were most likely to 
support property tax limitation (p. 261). The mobilization for property tax limitation was not a 
response to high tax rates. It was a response to the taxation of property at its market value.  
 To understand the effects of property tax limitations, it is useful to resort to algebra. We may 
represent the total property tax revenues Y of a local jurisdiction schematically by the equation 
Y=τΣvi, where τ is the local property tax rate and vi is the assessed value of an individual property i. 
Some early-twentieth-century efforts to limit property sought to constrain the tax by setting a 
maximum value for τ. The conventional scholarly wisdom is that these early property tax limitation 
laws proved to be easily circumvented. Local officials who were not free to increase τ could still 
achieve a desired increase of Y by manipulating the values of vi, for example by changing their rules 
for evaluating property, or by exercising discretion in the application of those rules. The drafters of 
the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century property tax limitations therefore went further 
to limit the increase of Y, the total property tax levy. 
 The property tax limitations described in Figure 2 aim to limit the property tax in one of two 
ways.2 The first strategy, which I will call an explicit levy limitation, is a fixed numerical cap on the 
annual growth rate of Y, the total property tax levy. If the aggregate value of local property is 
increasing faster than the cap permits—for example, if the housing market is booming—then 
jurisdictions subject to an explicit levy limitation must compensate for the increase in Σvi by reducing 
 
2 This classification simplifies the bewildering variety of property tax limitations, and excludes 
several other kinds of tax and expendiure limitations (or TELs) that are commonly classed with them. 
For the canonical conceptual typology, see Joyce and Mullins (1991); for other important overviews, 
see Mullins and Wallin (2004), Anderson (2006), and Haveman and Sexton (2008). 
the property tax rate τ. The best-known property tax limitation of this type is Massachusetts’ 
Proposition 2½, a 1980 law that, subject to some exclusions and caveats, constrains the aggregate 
property tax levy of any local government to increase by no more than 2.5% per year, plus an 
allowance for any new development that was added to the property tax base. The second strategy, 
which I will call implicit limitation, does not constrain Y directly, but instead imposes both a 
maximum value of τ and a legal cap on the growth rate of vi, the assessed value of any individual 
parcel. Implicit property tax limitation works by changing the rules for valuation of property. If the 
market value of local property is increasing faster than the cap permits, then local officials who are 
subject to an implicit property tax limitation must permit the assessed values of at least some 
individual properties to diverge from their market values. The best-known policy of this type is 
California’s Proposition 13, which constrains the tax rate to 1%, and constrains the assessed value of 
any individual property to increase no more rapidly than 2% per year until the parcel is sold, 
regardless of the change in its market value in the meantime. When an assessment limitation is 
combined with a limitation on the property tax rate, as it is in the case of Proposition 13, it is also a de 
facto limitation on the growth of the aggregate property tax levy. Unlike explicit levy limitations, 
however, an assessment limitation has the additional consequence of freezing the distribution of tax 
payments within the taxing jurisdiction. Under an assessment limitation, even very great relative 
changes in the value of real estate within the taxing jurisdiction must go unrecognized for tax 
purposes.3  
 
3 A further distinction may be drawn between assessment limitations that permit reassessment at the 
time a property is sold (as with Proposition 13) and assessment limitations that do not (as is the case, 
for example, with Oregon’s Measure 50). The former type is much more common, and is sometimes 
called acquisition value assessment (O’Sullivan et al., 1995) in contrast to market value assessment, 
because it amounts to taxing property on the value it had at the time it was acquired (plus an inflation 
adjustment). 
 What explicit and implicit levy limitations have in common is that they protect property 
owners from economic shocks that may arise from real estate price movements—and that they do so 
by limiting the resources available to local governments. These two types of property tax limitation 
otherwise differ in various ways. They may have different implications for the distribution of housing 
wealth and the operation of housing markets. They may also have different implications for voter 
awareness: implicit levy limitations allow every individual real property owner to monitor a local 
government’s compliance with the limit simply by reading year-to-year changes in his or her own 
property tax bill (Seljan, 2014). Both types of levy limitations, however, decouple property tax 
revenues from movements of the real estate market. And, as the following section will show, both 
types of limitations may have the effect of reducing state capacity in the long run. 
 
Property tax limitations and state capacity: a meta-regression analysis 
  
 The question of whether, and how much, property tax limitations affect state capacity has 
been the subject of considerable empirical inquiry, because it is not obvious that a policy of property 
tax limitation should have any effect. In the first place, the degree to which a limitation actually 
constrains the growth of the property tax levy depends on quantitative policy parameters. These vary 
substantially—California’s implicit property tax limitation caps annual increases at 2%, for example, 
while Minnesota’s explicit limitation caps annual increases at 3.9%—and some may be set so high 
that in a normal year they do not affect the behavior of local taxing authorities at all. State legislators 
might adopt an effectively nonbinding property tax limitation as a purely symbolic gesture, pandering 
to voters who like the idea of property tax limitation while avoiding the difficult conflicts entailed by 
any serious effort at retrenchment of local spending. In the second place, even potentially constraining 
property tax limitations may be circumvented. Public officials are not always faithful executors of 
policies made by others, perhaps especially not when the purpose of those policies is to constrain their 
power. Local officials who wish to increase revenues faster than a property tax levy limitation permits 
might have a variety of options, ranging from the creation of additional taxing jurisdictions, to the 
creative legal interpretation of what counts as a property tax, to simply raising taxes in defiance of 
state law. The options for circumventing a given property tax limitation will presumably depend on 
the particulars of how the law is drafted, but if such options exist, we might expect that revenue-
hungry officials will be motivated to find them (Kousser, McCubbins and Moule, 2008). 
 Even if property tax limitations do constrain property tax revenues, moreover, that does not 
mean that they constrain the growth of local government revenues or expenditures more generally. 
One one hand, officials who find their revenues constrained by a property tax limitation may simply 
increase other taxes to compensate for the unavailable property tax revenues. Some libertarian 
advocates of small government, reasoning along these lines, have been skeptical of property tax 
limitation: a policy of property tax limitation may introduce market distortions without actually 
constraining the increase of local budgets (e.g. Buchanan, 1979). On the other hand, the alternative 
revenue sources available to local government may not permit the same revenue growth as the 
property tax, inasmuch as they are more structurally constrained by tax competition. In contrast to real 
estate, other tax bases—such as sales or income—are more easily moved outside the city limits, and 
this mobility can provide a check on the growth of revenues. To the extent that a property tax 
limitation induces local government to shift from taxes on real estate to taxes that are levied on more 
mobile resources, it may constrain the growth of government indirectly. 
 Although several studies examine the effects of property tax limitation, conceptual and 
methodological differences among these studies complicate the interpretation of their findings. 
Conceptually, many studies of the impact of property tax levy limitations lump them together with 
one or another set of policies that limit the growth of local revenues or expenditures. This literature on 
the fiscal impact of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) in general (see the summary in Ballal and 
Rubenstein, 2009) provides only limited information about the effects of property tax limitation in 
particular. Different kinds of TELs may have very different effects. Methodologically, social 
scientists have relied on regression analysis of observational data to identify the effects of property tax 
limitation, and differences in the specification and estimation of these regression models may affect 
the estimates they yield. The existing studies also analyze data corresponding to different places, units 
of analysis, and years: they range from cross-section time-series analysis of local government 
revenues aggregated to the state level, to short panels of data on specific categories of local 
government within a single state. Even when these studies aim to estimate the same conceptual 
parameter (say, the effect of property tax limitation on property tax revenues per capita), the 
parameter in question may be context-dependent in ways that would make a simple average 
misleading.  
 My solution to these problems in the remainder of this paper is not to discard prior research 
but instead to summarize its findings with meta-regression analysis. Meta-regression analysis is a 
formal method for summarizing the results of quantitative research. This method permits us to 
average the findings of multiple studies, thereby increasing our sample size and reducing uncertainty, 
while adjusting the average for known differences in conceptualization, regression specification, and 
context. When confronted with multiple studies of the same quantitative relationship, one often wants 
to know an average result, and when the studies come to different conclusions, one may also wish to 
know whether the differences depend systematically on characteristics of the study. This is a problem 
in estimating a conditional mean; and in principle, regression analysisis by the method of least squares 
calculates the best linear unbiased estimate of a conditional mean. Thus meta-regression analysis: a 
regression analysis that takes as its data the coefficients estimated in previous regression analyses.  
 The process of summarizing the literature on property tax limitation with a meta-regression 
analysis proceeded in three stages: the construction of a sample of estimates, the coding of study 
characteristics, and the statistical estimation of a conditional mean. 
 The construction of the sample. I selected every estimate I could identify that met three 
criteria. First, it was published since 1978, the year of California’s Proposition 13, in a peer-reviewed 
journal. Some recent methodological texts on meta-analysis counsel the inclusion of unpublished 
studies in order to counteract the assumed bias of journal editors in favor of publishing papers that 
show large and statistically significant results (see e.g. Ringuist, 2013, Poot, 2014). The available 
methods for identifying, locating, and retrieving the relevant unpublished studies, however, have not 
been shown to address the most important sources of selection bias, and they may introduce potential 
selection biases of their own that are at least as grave as those they are designed to correct.4 The virtue 
of selecting only peer-reviewed studies is that it provides an impersonal and replicable criterion for 
identifying available results of adequate quality. 
 Second, studies to be included must have reported at least one regression estimate of the 
partial coefficient of property tax levy limitation in a regression of state or local revenues or 
expenditures. This criterion excluded qualitative case studies (e.g., Bennett and DiLorenzo, 1982; 
Saxton, Hoene and Erie, 2002) and simulations (e.g., Agarwal and Morgan, 1985; Anderson, 2012; 
Julia-Wise, Cooke and Holland, 2002; Waters, Holland, and Weber, 1997). It also excluded studies of 
state tax and expenditure limitations that do not limit the local property tax (e.g. Kioko and Martell, 
2012).  
 
4 The literature on meta-analysis discusses the problem of publication bias as the file drawer problem 
(Rosenthal, 1979; Simonsohn et al., 2014): journal editors may regard statistically insignificant results 
as uninteresting, and such results may therefore end up gathering dust in a file drawer, even if they are 
correct. The potential for such bias is real, but the mechanisms producing it are many and subtle, and 
the image of dozens of relevant papers sitting in file drawers for every published result is misleading. 
The realities of contemporary statistical practice in the social sciences are such that a statistically 
insignificant or equivocal result may not even be saved on a hard drive, or recognized by the 
investigator as a result worth writing up—much less written up in a paper that will be saved for 
decades in a file drawer, only to be remembered and made available, on request, to a stranger who 
may be suspected of having an axe to grind. An additional complication is that many rejected or 
unsubmitted papers, and perhaps most, may have been rejected or remained unsubmitted for the good 
reason that their methods were unsound. Even if an unbiased index to the proverbial file drawer 
studies existed, so that a representative sample of these studies could be obtained, they must then be 
vetted for relevance and quality. There is no reason to think that the judgments of meta-analysts about 
these matters are more unbiased than the judgments of journal referees. 
 Although regression-based designs were common in the literature, different studies employed 
different operational definitions of property tax limitation. Because the focus of this review is on 
property tax levy limitations, I excluded studies of laws that merely capped the property tax rate, 
without also limiting the annual growth of property tax revenues (see, e.g., Nguyen-Hoang, 2013); but 
I included studies of implicit levy limitations that capped the property tax levy by capping the 
property tax rate and the annual increase of assessed property values. I included studies that grouped 
subtypes of modern property tax levy limitation together, as well as studies that treated them 
separately. I also included studies that subsumed property tax limitations into a more general category 
of policy such as potentially binding tax and expenditure limitations (Joyce and Mullins, 1991) and 
reported estimates of the average impact of policies belonging to the more general category.  
 Third, I included only estimated coefficients of property tax limitation from regression 
models that operationalized the presence of property tax limitation as a dichotomous variable. The 
estimates summarized here therefore refer to the average difference in the measured outcome between 
units with and without property tax limitations. This regression specification is common in the 
literature—it is, indeed, the only specification common to more than one study, and thus the only 
specification that permits a quantitative summary of any kind—but it disregards potentially relevant 
differences in the stringency and coverage of property tax limitations. A study using this method will 
yield an estimate of what the average property tax levy limitation has done, which is likely to be a 
conservative estimate of what the most stringent property tax limitations have done, to say nothing of 
what property tax limitations can do. To the extent that this dummy variable specification averages 
over differences among heterogeneous policies, we may expect that coefficients will be biased 
towards zero. Alternative specifications in the literature model the effect of property tax limitation as 
a variable function of home prices (Alm, Buschman, and Sjoquist, 2011); as the coefficient of the 
number of kinds of tax and limitation laws implemented in a given state, from zero to two (Baker, 
2003); as a function of the number of years in which levy reductions were required to meet the target 
(Bradbury, Mayer and Case, 2001); and the coefficient of the percentage of value exempt from 
taxation (Twait, 2011). Such alternative specifications generally find that property tax limitations do, 
in fact, reduce state capacity, but they do not yield commensurable estimates, and so they are not 
easily summarized with a statement about how much property tax limitations reduce state capacity. 
Because my present purpose is to say something about how much, on average, property tax limitations 
reduce state capacity, I limit my attention to studies that produce commensurable answers to that 
question. 
 The search for estimates that met these criteria proceeded in stages. First, I consulted 
published literature reviews including Anderson (2006), Haveman and Sexton (2008), Martin (2008: 
ch. 7), and Ballal and Rubenstein (2009). Second, I searched the Social Science Citation Index, 
Google Scholar, and JSTOR with the keywords property tax or the combination of the keywords tax 
and limitation. I inspected all titles and abstracts for relevance, and I read a subset of 80 studies that 
appeared likely to meet the criteria for inclusion. Third, I identified relevant sources cited in the 
studies I had selected for inclusion. I also conducted a reverse bibliographic search for recent studies 
that cited the studies I had already selected for inclusion. Fourth, I consulted the tables of contents of 
relevant journals that I had identified in the early stages of my search, including the National Tax 
Journal, Regional Science and Urban Economics, Public Finance Review, Education Finance and 
Policy, and Public Budgeting and Finance.5 The studies that were selected for inclusion are described 
in Table 1. 
-------------------- 
TABLE 1 HERE 
------------------- 
 Coding procedures. Once I selected studies, I recorded the estimated impact of property tax 
limitation. I transformed each estimate into a semi-elasticity of dollars per capita, or the estimated 
percentage difference in dollars per capita between a unit with property tax limitation and a unit 
 
5 While this systematic search strategy gives me some confidence that my sample is complete, in the 
sense that it includes every estimate meeting my search criteria that was published in a peer-reviewed 
journal from 1978 to the present, I would welcome references to any additional studies that meet these 
criteria if I have missed them. 
without property tax limitation. In most cases this required no transformation whatsoever, as most of 
the regression specifications in the literature are designed to estimate semi-elasticities of per capita 
fiscal quantities. The appendix to this paper lists the different functional forms of the regression 
estimates included in the database, and the algebraic transformations (if any) that were required to 
render them into comparable semi-elasticities.  
 I also coded each estimate for characteristics of the underlying regression model. First, I 
coded a dichotomous variable equal to one if the model lumped together property tax limitation with 
other limitations on local government revenues or expenditures. Second, I coded a dichotomous 
variable equal to one if the regression equation omitted to control for the presence of other local 
TELs. A model that does not control for the presence of alternative forms of local TEL may 
underestimate or overestimate the impact of property tax levy limitation. Third, I coded a 
dichotomous variable equal to one if the underlying study sample was limited to a single state. Fourth, 
I also coded for whether the underlying regression equation included any adjustment for unmeasured 
time-invariant differences between jurisdictions with and without property tax limitation. A study 
might adjust for such time-invariant charateristics by including jurisdiction-specific fixed effects, or 
by first-differencing all variables. A study that fails to adjust in either of these ways is likely to 
confound the impact of a property tax limitation with the impact of unmeasured characteristics of the 
states that subsequently adopt a property tax limitation. All of these dichotomous variables are coded 
so that the reference category is the preferred specification. Thanks to this coding scheme, the 
intercept in the meta-regression analysis that follows may be interpreted directly as the effect we 
would expect to estimate in a model with the best specification: namely, one that that treats property 
tax limitation separately from other TELs, controls for the presence of other local TELs, samples 
multiple states, and controls for time-invariant characteristics of the jurisdiction. Note that even with 
these adjustments, however, the outcome of the meta-analysis is an average coefficient; and if the 
effects of property tax limitations vary systematically with other, unmeasured features of context, then 
the average may be uninformative or misleading. 
 I report separate meta-analytic results for each of three dependent variables. The first 
dependent variable is the estimated impact of property tax limitation on property tax revenues per 
capita. The second dependent variable is the estimated impact of property tax limitation on other 
(non-property-tax) revenues per capita. This general heading encompasses all estimates of the impact 
of property tax limitation on revenues from any non-property-tax revenue source, where the sources in 
question range in specificity from such specific categories as school lunch fees per capita to such 
general categories as total per capita local own-source revenues net of property taxes. The 
heterogeneity of fiscal variables under this heading might lead us to expect that property tax limitation 
would have heterogeneous effects, in which case any estimate of the average effect of property tax 
limitation on non-property-tax revenues may be biased toward zero. The third dependent variable is 
the estimated impact of property tax limitation on any aggregate measure of local government 
budgets, including measures of local expenditures and various total measures of local revenues (e.g., 
total revenues, total own-source revenues, or total tax revenues). At the local level, aggregate 
revenues and aggregate expenditures are roughly equivalent measures of the overall magnitude of a 
public budget, because bond markets and, in many cases, state and local law effectively prohibit local 
governments from operating at a deficit for any length of time. Table 2 reports the number of 
estimates and the means of these variables, alongside the mean of the dependent variable, for each of 
three dependent variables in this study. 
-------------------- 
TABLE 2 HERE 
------------------- 
 Statistical methods. The standard regression assumption that errors are independent and 
identically distributed is inappropriate in the context of a meta-regression of published research 
results. Because the data are regression estimates with unequal variances, they are not identically 
distributed. I therefore fit the meta-regression equations by generalized least squares, with each 
observation weighted in proportion to the inverse of the standard error of the semi-elasticity (see 
Koetse, Florax, and de Groot, 2010; Poot, 2013). Because multiple estimates from the same published 
study are unlikely to be independent of each other, I treat each published study as a cluster of 
observations, and compute the standard errors of the meta-regression from a cluster robust variance 
estimator that permits an arbitrary correlation structure among observations from the same cluster (see 
Ringquist, 2013). Finally, I compute statistical significance tests for coefficients using the wild cluster 
boostrap recommended by Cameron and Miller (2015) for clustered data with few clusters.6 
 Findings. Do property tax levy limitations actually limit the property tax levy? To answer this 
question I summarize 41 estimates of the impact of property tax limitation on per capita property tax 
revenues from 11 studies. Summary statistics suggest that property tax limitations do have the 
intended effect: they reduce property tax revenues. The precise magnitude of the effect is unclear. The 
unweighted average semi-elasticity is -0.13; the weighted average semi-elasticity, with weights 
proportional to the inverse of the standard error, is -.11. Many of these studies lump property tax levy 
limitations together with other TELs, and it is not clear from the average what portion of the average 
effect is attributable to property tax limitation as such. 
 To adjust for differences in conceptualization and measurement of the impact of property tax 
limitation, I therefore regressed the semi-elasticity of property tax revenues per capita on a vector of 
dummy variables describing study characteristics. The first column of Table 3 reports the results. The 
intercept, -0.11, describes the proportional impact of property tax limitation on property tax revenues 
 
6 The p-value associated with a focal variable represents the proportion of times that a t-statistic 
computed from the coefficient and standard error of that variable exceeded the analogous t-statistic 
computed after a regression over one of 999 pseudo-samples generated from a simulation that 
assumed the null hypothesis to be true. In each pseudo-sample, the dependent variable y was replaced 
by a predicted value y*=β’x+δiu, where u was the residual from a regression of y on all x’s except the 
focal variable; i indexes the cluster (in this case, the published study); and δi was a randomly chosen 
(wild) element of {-√1.5, -1, -√.5, √.5, 1, √1.5}. In monte carlo studies of clusterered data with few 
clusters, this wild cluster bootstrap has been shown to produce more accurate p-values than the cluster 
robust variance estimator, which only approaches satisfactory levels of unbiasedness and efficiency as 
the number of clusters exceeds about fifty. See Cameron and Miller (2015). 
per capita that we would expect to measure in a study with the best specification (a study of property 
tax limitations only, controlling for the presence of other local TELs and for time-invariant 
characteristics of the jurisdiction, in a sample covering multiple states). The bootstrapped p-value of 
.098 means that an effect of this magnitude would be expected by chance in fewer than 10% of cases 
if the true effect were zero. The meta-analysis also reveals how measurement choices of prior studies 
may affect their estimates. Studies of single state, for example, are expected to find even stronger 
effects of property tax limitation on property tax revenues. It may be that single-state case studies are 
likely to be conducted in states that have especially stringent property tax limitations, while multi-
state studies average across property tax limitations of variable stringency in ways that attenuate 
estimates of the effects of the strictest property tax limitations. The meta-regression results also show 
that regression analyses that fail to control for the confounding presence of other forms of TEL may 
substantially underestimate the impact of property tax limitation. 
-------------------- 
TABLE 3 HERE 
------------------- 
 Do property tax limitations increase reliance on other revenue sources per capita? I 
summarize 59 estimates from six studies. The weighted average semi-elasticity of 0.035 suggests a 
positive impact, but this quantity averages a decidedly mixed pattern of findings, including several 
negative semi-elasticities, two large positive outliers, and most estimates quite close to zero. The 
variability in findings may be dependent on the particular non-property-tax revenue source in question 
or on other study characteristics. The meta-regression results summarized in the second column of 
Table 3 clarify that the expected effect of a property tax limitation on non-property-tax revenues is 
indistinguishable from zero. The intercept of .006 implies that the best estimate (from a multi-state 
study that distinguishes property tax limitations from other TELs, controls for the confounding 
influence of other TELs, and controls for time-invariant characteristics of the jurisdiction) is trivially 
different from zero, and the bootstrapped p-value of .55 indicates that an estimate at least this large 
might be expected by chance in a majority of cases even if the true effect were zero. It may be that 
property tax limitations truly have no effect on other tax and non-tax revenue sources, or it may be 
that the average effect is attenuated by the heterogeneity of estimates summarized in this meta-
regression, which concern a variety of non-property-tax dependent variables. All of the estimates are 
from multi-state studies, but the variation in findings also might reflect other sampling differences in 
the time periods or jurisdictions studied, and, by extension, real heterogeneity in local governments’ 
revenue strategies. Local officials have many options for adapting to a property tax limitation; one 
city might raise sales taxes, while another might cut expenditures, and a third might rely on a mix of 
increased fees and hotel taxes, or what have you. 
 If property tax limitations decrease property tax revenues, and do not cause an increase in 
revenues from alternative sources, then it is to be expected that their net impact on aggregate local 
government revenues and aggregate local expenditures will be negative. That is indeed what meta-
analysis shows. The literature includes 59 estimates of the impact of tax limitation on various 
measures of aggregate local budgets from 14 studies. The estimates included here include estimated 
impacts on measures of aggregate local government revenues per capita (from multiple sources that 
include the property tax), and measures of local government expenditures per capita. Most estimates 
of the impact of property tax levy limits on these per capita budget quantities are negative. The 
unweighted mean semi-elasticity is -.027, but this average is influenced by a substantial outlier, and 
the weighted semi-elasticity is only -0.0065. Property tax limitations reduce local government 
spending, but the proportional impact on spending is not as great as the proportional impact on 
property tax revenues. The finding of a moderate negative impact is what we should expect: all else 
being equal, an 11% reduction in property tax revenues will imply a less-than-11% reduction in the 
local budget, unless a local government relies exclusively on property tax revenues. 
 The meta-regression results in the last column of Table 3 confirm that property tax limitation 
has a negative impact on total local spending per capita. The intercept, which represents the expected 
impact of property tax limitation on aggregate local budget estimated in a model with the preferred 
specification, is -0.053, with a bootstrapped p-value of .046. We may infer with a relatively high 
degree of certainty that budgets per capita after adoption of a property tax limitation are, on average, 
about 5% lower than they would be otherwise. The coefficient of +.063 associated with models that 
omit controls for other local TELs implies that the impact of property tax limitation can be entirely 
obscured by the confounding presence of other policies that limit local government revenue or 
expenditure growth. 
 
The social impact of property tax limitation 
 
 The most general implication of these findings is that property tax limitation is a policy with 
distinctive consequences—at least in part because the taxation of land differs from other forms of 
taxation. The heterogeneous findings of the literature on tax and expenditure limitations or TELs, 
particularly with respect to the effects of TELs on aggregate fiscal quantities other than property tax 
revenues, result both from heterogeneous measurement decisions and from real heterogeneity in the 
effects of the various policies at issue. The evidence reviewed here suggests that the umbrella 
category itself may have limited analytical utility. To generalize about the effects of TELs is to 
overgeneralize. A limitation on the growth of the property tax levy can have the effect of limiting the 
growth of local spending, but it does not necessarily have the same effect as an explicit limitation on 
local spending, or as an easily evaded limitation on the property tax rate, or as a non-binding truth-in-
taxation policy that merely requires voter notification of revenue increases. And its effects may be 
very different indeed from those of a limitation on state appropriations or expenditures (cf. Kioko and 
Martell 2011). 
 In particular, the findings summarized here are consistent with the hypothesis that property 
tax limitations provide social protection to some homeowners, but at the cost of diminished state 
capacity—including, ironically, the capacity to provide social protection to other people or groups. A 
state policy of property tax limitation may be a major constraint on the growth of local government 
finance. By limiting the ability of local officials to tax the one resource that cannot be moved across 
county lines, property tax limitation constrains local revenues in general. Because local governments 
cannot long spend more than they take in, property tax limitation will tend to restrain the capacity of 
the local state to provide public services. The political sociology of the welfare state has sometimes 
associated Polanyi’s concept of the countermovement with mobilization in support  of the welfare 
state (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990). But Polanyi (2001 [1944]) noted that social protection from the 
market could also take conservative and anti-statist forms of social closure against the market, 
including the defense of local status orders and quasi-feudal property relations. Property tax limitation 
more resembles the latter. At its limit, property tax limitation may approximate a regime of 
aristocratic privilege, in which a socially closed group of landed property owners enjoy tax 
exemptions linked to their special status. 
 The findings summarized here also suggest that some of the critics’ claims about the broader 
social impacts of property tax limitation may be plausible hypotheses worth testing. It is a 
foundational principle of fiscal sociology that taxation has important consequences for resources 
available to the state, and thereby, in Joseph Schumpeter’s phrase, for all of “the deeds its policy may 
prepare” (1991 [1918], p. 101). By reducing the taxation of real estate, a policy of property tax 
limitation may have a substantial impact on the inequality of housing wealth, and thereby on wealth 
inequality in general. By reducing local spending, property tax limitation may reduce spending on 
services from public education to public health that are particularly important to the household 
budgets of low-income Americans. Education is particularly important, and particularly concerning: 
local property taxation is the single greatest source of funding for public schools, and resource 
inequalities among school districts may produce substantial inequalities in learning outcomes 
(Jackson, Johnson, and Persico, 2016; Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2018; Owens, 2017). 
Researchers have found that districts subject to property tax limitations may have larger class sizes 
(Figlio, 1997), worse teacher qualifications (Figlio and Rueben, 2001), and lower test scores 
(Downes, Dye and McGuire, 1998; Figlio, 1997). Property tax limitation may also affect other social 
outcomes with socio-economic gradients, from subjective outcomes such as well-being, satisfaction 
with public services, and trust in government, to intersubjectively verifiable outcomes such as 
morbidity and mortality (see Newman and O’Brien, 2010).  
 Karl Polanyi argued 75 years ago that land was necessary to social reproduction, and that 
whenever land was treated as a pure commodity, households therefore could be expected to take 
collective action to protect their social ties from the destructive effects of the price mechanism. He 
also argued that such protection sometimes comes at a steep social and cultural cost. If we object to 
the stratifying effects of property tax limitation, we would do well to consider alternative means of 
providing households with economic security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
All of the studies summarized in the meta-regression analysis report regressions of fiscal quantities on 
a dummy variable representing the presence of a property tax limitation (or a more encompassing 
category of TEL). The regression specifications vary, and in order to summarize them meaningfully it 
is necessary to transform regression coefficients into a common measure of impact. I chose the semi-
elasticity of dollars per capita, or the proportional change in per capita fiscal quantitites associated 
with the presence of a property tax limitation. Most regression specifications included one coefficient 
that could be interpreted directly as a semi-elasticity of dollars per capita, but in some cases the 
transformation of the coefficient into a semi-elasticity required additional information about the mean 
of the dependent variable. The appendix Table A lists the studies summarized here by generic 
regression specification, and details the algebraic form of the semi-elasticity derived from each 
generic specification. The notation is as follows: Y is the dollar-denominated fiscal variable (usually 
representing a measure of aggregate revenues from a particular source, but in some cases representing 
aggregate expenditures or aggregate revenues from multiple sources, as in the meta-analysis 
summarized in Figure 3). T is a dummy variable for the presence of a property tax limit. P is the 
measure of population that provides the denominator of per-capita calculations (usually P represents 
the total residents of a given jurisdiction, but some measures of school revenues or expenditures are 
reported in the literature per pupil rather than per adult resident). X is a vector of covariates including 
a constant. The Greek letter β represents the regression coefficient of T, γ represents the regression 
coefficient of X, φ represents the regression coefficient of P, and ε represents the error term. 
Horizontal bars over letters represent mean values. All quantities are annual measures, unless prefixed 
by the Greek letter Δ, which signifies year-on-year change.  
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Figure 1. Difference between growth rate of housing prices and growth rate of GDP per capita 
 
 
Sources: Shiller 2015; Sutch 2006; Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Notes: Circled data points correspond to the dates of well-known property tax protests, including the Populist rebellion (1894), the campaign for 
Amendment 1 in California (1910), the Great-Depression-era wave of tax strikes (1932), the Oakland general strike (1946), the largest property tax 
protest in the history of Los Angeles (1958), and the campaign for Proposition 13 in California (1978). 
 Figure 2. States with explicit or implicit limitations on the property tax levy, 1913-2010 
 
 
Source: Martin and Beck 2016 
 
 
 Table 1. Selected characteristics of studies in the sample 
 
Publication Unit of analysis Sample(s) Sample years Dependent variables 
Preston and Ichniowski (1991) Municipality U.S. 1976 - 1986 Total rev., property taxes 
Dye and McGuire (1997) Various Various 1987 - 1993 Total exp., instructional exp., operating exp. 
Figlio (1997) School U.S. 1987 - 1993 Administrative exp. 
Shadbegian (1998) State U.S., excl. 
Alaska 
1972 - 1992 Local own-source general rev., property taxes 
Skidmore (1999) State U.S., excl. 
Alaska 
1976 - 1990 Property taxes, non-property taxes, federal 
and state aid, local charges and misc. rev., 
state misc. rev. 
Shadbegian (1999) County All counties 1976 - 1990 Own-source general rev., property taxes, non-
property taxes, non-tax rev. 
Skidmore (1999) State U.S., excl. 
Alaska 
1962 - 1987 Local own source rev. 
Figlio and O'Sullivan (2001) Municipality Cities with pop. 
>2000 
1975 - 1986 Administrative exp., police and fire exp. 
Shadbegian (2003) State Contiguous 
states 
1966 - 1992 Local direct own-source education exp.  
Blankenau and Skidmore 
(2004) 
State Contiguous 
states 
1971 - 1993 Local direct own-source education exp., state 
aid to school districts 
Dye Mcguire McMillen (2005) School district Illinois school 
districts 
1988 - 2001 Operating exp., instructional exp. 
Gore (2009) Municipality U.S. 1997 - 2003 Total taxes, property taxes  
McCubbins and Moule (2010) State U.S., excl. 
Alaska 
1980 - 2000 State and local property taxes 
Anderson (2011) City Minnesota 1977 - 2002 Total exp. 
Hoyt, Coomes and Biehl 
(2011) 
State States 1977 - 2002 Property taxes, non-property-taxes, education 
exp. 
Jung and Bae (2011) County U.S. 1980 - 2003 Own source rev., total taxes, user charges 
Anderson (2011) City Minnesota 2000 - 2001 Capital exp., current exp., property taxes, 
intergovernmental aid 
Seljan (2014) State U.S., excl. 
Alaska 
1970 - 2006 State and local property taxes 
Sun (2014) Municipality Cities with 
pop.>25,000 
1970 - 2006 Property taxes, sales taxes, income taxes,  
other taxes, misc. general rev., user charges 
Downes and Killeen (2014) School district U.S. 1972 - 2008 Fees, transportation fees, rev. from school 
lunch, total own-source non-tax rev., rev. 
from local sources 
 
  
Table 2. Sample means of selected study characteristics, by dependent variable 
 
 Dependent variable is impact of property tax limitation on... 
 
...property tax revenue ... non-property-tax revenues ...total revenues or expenditures 
 unweighted weighted unweighted weighted unweighted weighted 
Semi-elasticity -0.13 -.011 0.19 .035 -0.027 -0.0065 
Independent variable includes 
other local TELs? (1=yes) 
0.54 .37 0.85 .83 0.69 0.73 
Model fails to control for other 
local TELs? (1=yes) 
0.76 .80 0.73 .89 0.71 1.00 
Sample is from a single state? 
(1=yes) 
0.24 .97 0 1 0.17 0.26 
Model is unadjusted for time-
invariant characteristics of state 
or jurisdiction? (1=yes) 
0.46 .10 0.14 .03 0.39 0.40 
N estimates 41  59  59  
N studies 11  6  14  
 
  
Table 3. Results of meta-regression analysis 
 
 
Property tax Other revenues 
Total revenues or 
expenditures 
 
Effect p-value Effect p-value Effect p-value 
Intercept -.114 .098 0.006 .55 -.053 .046 
Estimated effect 
includes other local 
TELs? (1=yes) -.006 .466 -.021 .42 -.017 .434 
Model fails to control 
for other local TELs? 
(1=yes) .108 .168 .052 .326 .063 .026 
Sample is from a single 
state? (1=yes) -.034 .098 ...  -.027 .300 
Model is unadjusted for 
time-invariant 
characteristics of state 
or jurisdiction? 
(1=yes) .009 .122 -.002 .89 -.0085 .390 
N estimates 41 
 
59 
 
59 
 
M studies 11  6  14  
 
Note: P-values are computed from a wild cluster bootstrap (see Cameron and Miller 2015).
Table A-1. Functional forms of regression equations and derived semi-elasticities of dollars per capita with respect to property tax limitation 
 
Functional form Derived 
semi-
elasticity 
Sources reporting models with this functional 
form 
ln(Y/P)= βT + γX + ε      β Anderson (2011), Downes and Killeen (2014), 
Shadbegian (1998) 
(Y/P)= βT + γX + ε     𝛽/?̅? Blankenau and Skidmore (2004); Figlio and 
O’Sullivan (2001); Hoyt, Coomes and Biehl 
(2011); Jung and Bae (2011); Shadbegian 
(1999); Shadbegian (2003); Skidmore (1999); 
Sun (2014) 
ln(Y)= βT + φln(P) + γX+ ε      β McCubbins and Moule (2010), Seljan (2014) 
ΔY/Y= βT +φΔP/P+γX+ ε     β Dye and McGuire (1997); Dye, McGuire and 
McMillen (2005) 
Δ(Y/P)= βT + γX + ε 
 
    β Dye and McGuire (1997); Gore (2009); Preston 
and Ichniowski (1991); Shadbegian (1998) 
 
 
